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Abstract  The paper presents an empirical test of local fiscal competition in Norway 
based on the observation that interregional migration during the business cycle 
creates very different incentives for rural and urban municipalities to influence 
population movements. Panel-data evidence is presented suggesting that 
municipalities indeed attempt to control population flows. The sensitivity of 
municipal spending and revenue decisions to population movements varies between 
municipalities in a way that is consistent with the municipalities' incentives to 
influence location decisions of households. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A large theoretical literature examines how inter-jurisdictional competition for 
mobile households and firms affect local spending and tax decisions (see surveys by 
Wilson (1999), Wellisch (2000) and Wilson and Wildasin (2004)). Empirical studies of 
inter-jurisdictional competition typically estimate reaction function which shows 
how the spending and tax decisions of a jurisdiction depends on those of its 
competitors, usually assumed to be the neighbouring jurisdictions (surveys of 
empirical studies of strategic interactions between local governments are provided 
by Brueckner (2003) and Revelli (2005)). The main methodological challenge of this 
literature is to discriminate between alternative explanations for the observed spatial 
pattern of policy decisions. Correlations in spending and taxes between neighbours 
do not necessarily indicate that competition for resources is taking place; common 
shocks, spillovers and yardstick competition may also cause spatial correlations in 
spending and taxes. 
 
Several recent contributions have included additional information about the 
preferences and constraints of local jurisdictions to discriminate between yardstick 
competition and other hypotheses (Bordignon, Cerniglia and Revelli 2003; Revelli 
2006; Revelli and Tovmo 2006). However, to my knowledge, no study has tried to 
identify whether spatial correlations in local spending and taxes is due to fiscal 
competition rather than alternative explanations.  
 
This paper presents an empirical test of local fiscal competition that does not use 
spatial correlations of policy decision to evaluate whether local authorities set 
spending and taxes to compete for mobile production factors. My approach is based 
on the observation that urban and rural municipalities in Norway face very different 
incentives to influence population flows. The reason is that migration from rural to 
urban areas is highly correlated with macroeconomic conditions. Population flows 
from the periphery to cities are large when the economy is booming and small 
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during downturns. This migration pattern suits urban municipalities well: people 
move in when unemployment is falling but not when unemployment is rising. In 
contrast, the time variation of population flows is painful for rural municipalities: 
people emigrate when jobs are created but not during recessions.   
 
The very different consequences of inter-regional migration for urban and rural 
areas imply that municipalities in rural areas have stronger incentives to smooth 
population flows than municipalities in urban areas. Thus, if local authorities 
actually attempt to control population flows, we would expect the impact of out-
migration on efforts to dampen outflows or raise inflows to be stronger in rural areas 
than in urban areas.  This is exactly what we find: compared to urban municipalities, 
municipalities in rural areas respond to an increase in out-migration by spending 
more on day care and schools at the expense of health care and care for the elderly, 
and by cutting taxes and fees. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic 
argument, and section 3 describes the panel data sample. Section 4 presents the 
hypotheses to be tested and the basic empirical specification. Results are presented 
in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Outline of the basic argument  
 
If one were to assess whether local authorities set local fiscal variables to influence 
population flows, a natural approach would be to estimate cross-section or panel-
data regressions using a measure of local inputs or local tax rates as dependent 
variable and the net out-migration rate as explanatory variable. The latter variable 
serves as proxy for the incentives to act strategically. The argument is that local 
communities which experience large net outflows of people will be more inclined to 
tailor fiscal decisions to the preferences of potential movers than communities which 
succeed in keeping the population stable or increasing. 
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However, using this empirical relation to draw inferences about the behavioural 
motives of local authorities is not straightforward. Population flows provide 
information about a community's future demographic structure and therefore the 
future demand for local government services. If local authorities adjust the level and 
composition of local government services in anticipation of future demand changes, 
local fiscal variables may become correlated with migration variables.        
 
I will show that population flows in Norway depend on macroeconomic conditions 
in systematic ways and argue that these regularities can be used to evaluate whether 
the estimated relations between local fiscal variables and population flows are due to 
strategic behaviour on the part of the municipalities.   
 
                               - Table 1 about here -       
 
Table 1 presents some basic facts about population flows in Norway. I have allocated 
the municipalities of Norway to two subsamples, denoted urban and rural areas. The 
urban areas consist of the main city areas, all or most municipalities in the counties 
of Akershus, Østfold, Buskerud and Vestfold, and the southern belts of Hedemark, 
Oppland and Agder.1 Municipalities located close to city areas are classified as urban 
if their migration patterns conform to that of urban areas.  
 
Due to migration, rural areas lost on average 0.25% of their population each year 
from 1987 to 2004 whereas the average annual population increase of urban areas 
due to migration was 0.35% 2 Population flows are larger during booms (defined as 
                     
1The core municipalities of the five largest cities are omitted as their migration patterns seem to 
be idiosyncratic, conforming neither to those of urban or rural municipalities. Municipalities 
which have been amalgamated with other municipalities since 1987 are also omitted, leaving 
156 urban municipalities and 253 rural municipalities. 
2Due to migration to or from Norway, in-migration to urban areas does not equal out-migration 
from rural areas.  
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years with positive national employment growth) than during downturns. The 
pairwise correlations between net out-migration from rural areas and, respectively, 
change in national unemployment and national employment growth are -0.61 and 
0.55; the corresponding correlations for urban areas are 0.41 and -0.58.  
 
The correlations listed in the last column of the second part of Table 1 illustrate that 
variation in migration flows over the business cycle poses a serious problem for 
municipalities in rural areas. For the rural areas taken together, the correlation 
between net out-migration and change in the unemployment rate is -0.60. Thus, 
municipalities in rural areas suffer from relatively high outflows of people when 
unemployment is falling, whereas outflows are relatively modest when 
unemployment increases. The reason is that net-out migration from rural areas is 
negatively correlated with national unemployment which in turn is positively 
correlated with unemployment both in rural and in urban areas. Hence, urban areas 
siphon labour from rural areas exactly when rural areas need workers to fill jobs. In 
contrast, the migration pattern suits urban areas well: people move in when 
unemployment is falling but otherwise not. 
 
The very different consequences of population movements during the business cycle 
imply that municipalities in rural areas have stronger incentives to smooth 
population flows than municipalities in urban areas. Thus, if municipalities actually 
attempt to control population flows, we would expect the impact of net out-
migration on efforts to dampen outflows or raise inflows to be stronger in rural areas 
than in urban areas. If, on the contrary, municipalities merely respond passively to 
population movements, rural and urban municipalities should react roughly similar 
to changes in out-migration.   
 
Macroeconomic variables are able to predict out-migration rates of individual 
municipalities quite well. Panel-data regressions for 1987-2004 explaining net out-
migration rates at the municipal level as a function of macroeconomic variables 
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(national unemployment, change in unemployment, employment growth and 
vacancy rate) interacted with dummy variables for each county (two dummy 
variables for counties with both urban and rural municipalities), produce predicted 
net out-migration rates which are highly correlated with actual out-migration rates. 
The correlations are 0.41 and 0.32 for the urban and rural areas, respectively.   
 
The interacted macroeconomic variables are good candidates as instruments for 
population flows. Not only do they predict net out-migration rates well, they are 
also unlikely to be correlated with the error term in regressions of local fiscal 
variables since local fiscal variables have at most a marginal influence on the 
national business cycle (Langørgen 1994). By using the interacted macroeconomic 
variables as instruments for net out-migration, we can be confident that any relation 
detected between local fiscal variables and population flows are not due to reverse 
causality.         
 
3. Data description 
 
In Norway, local government plays an important role in providing public services; 
about two-thirds of all government employees work in the local sector and most of 
these in the municipalities. Municipalities therefore have discretion to affect 
population flows if location decisions depend on the quality and volume of local 
government services. 
 
We can distinguish between two types of local policy decisions. At the general level, 
municipalities can adjust total spending and the spending mix between the main 
municipal services. At the specific level, decisions can be directed at individual firms 
or persons. I will confine the empirical analysis to the first type of policy decisions as 
appropriate data about the latter are not available. 
 
The municipalities basically provide six types of services; day care, primary 
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education, culture, primary health care, care for the elderly and infrastructure. For 
five of these, I construct input measures which describe the municipalities' 
commitment of resources; good input measures are not available for infrastructure.  
 
The Norwegian grant system was completely transformed in the mid eighties, and 
1987 is therefore my first year of observation. For most municipal services, the 
spending categories listed in the municipal accounts have been redefined during the 
period covered by my study, making comparisons across years difficult. With one 
exception (culture), I use physical input measures (e.g. teacher man years per pupil) 
to characterize local fiscal decisions as physical input measures are less affected by 
changes in variable definitions than spending variables.  
 
                               - Table 2 about here -       
 
Table 2 presents summary statistics. The data sources are Statistics Norway, The 
Norwegian Social Sciences Data Base and the Norwegian Association of House 
Owners.   
 
For three of the municipal services, primary education, primary health care and care 
for the elderly, I consider input of person years per user or potential user.  To 
describe the supply of day care services, I use day care slots per child 0-6.3  
As time series of physical input measures for cultural activities are not available, I 
study total per capita spending on culture.  
 
The municipalities’ main sources of revenues are grants from the government, 
income and wealth taxes, infrastructure fees and property taxes. As all 
municipalities employ the maximum income and wealth tax rates, decisions on fees 
and property taxes are the main revenue decisions made the municipalities. Aside 
                     
3In 1997 the age of entering primary education was lowered from seven to six years. The 
denominators of variables for day care and primary education are therefore altered from 
1996 to 1997. 
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from health care and care for the elderly, for which the fee structure is heavily 
regulated by the state, fees are primarily levied for infrastructure services to 
residents (water, etc). Time series at the municipal level of average fees paid for a 
standardized apartment have been collected by the Norwegian Association of Home 
Owners for about one-fourth of the municipalities (their data set is unbalanced).4 
 
Property taxes from hydroelectric power plants are an important source of revenues 
for many municipalities in rural areas. As these revenues presumably have a modest 
impact on location decisions (other than via local spending), I omit municipalities 
that receive property taxes from hydroelectric plants in the analysis of property 
taxes.5 I also omit municipalities with less than 3000 inhabitants since many small 
municipalities are not allowed to levy property taxes, leaving a total of 114 
municipalities.6 The dependent variable is computed as total annual property taxes 
per capita. 
 
The explanatory variable of main interest is the net out-migration rate, defined as 
annual net out-migration scaled by the population. I also allow input and revenue 
decisions to depend on the demand for and cost of producing local services. Many 
proxy variables for demand and cost factors do not vary across time and are 
therefore not included since I estimate fixed effects regressions. The following 
explanatory variables are included: Revenues from grants, income taxes and wealth 
taxes, and the population shares of children, pupils and elderly.   
 
Earlier studies of Norwegian municipalities have shown that local spending and 
                     
4Borge (2000) provides detailed information about this data set.   
 
5Time series of property taxes from persons and firms other than hydroelectric plants are not 
available, but there exists a cross-section survey from 1991 which allows identification of 
municipalities with property taxes from hydroelectric plants. 
6Unfortunately, whether a municipality is allowed to levy property taxes has until recently not 
been precisely defined by the law and controversies have been settled by the courts on a case-
by-case basis.    
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revenue decisions are affected by political attributes of the municipal council, 
including party fragmentation and ideological orientation (Kalseth and Rattsø 1998; 
Borge and Rattsø 2004; Borge 2005; Carlsen, Langset and Rattsø 2005). My 
explanatory variables include the share of socialist councillors and the Herfindahl 
index, which is a measure of party fragmentation in the municipal council.  
 
Data on the input variables are available for the period 1987-2004 with the exception 
of primary education and care for the elderly for which consistent time series are 
available from the early nineties. Data on revenue variables are available from 1991.  
 
Spending on culture and exogenous revenues (grants, income taxes and wealth 
taxes) are deflated by the price index for municipal consumption, whereas fees and 
property taxes are deflated by the consumer price index; 1987 is the base year in each 
case.  Stock variables are registered at the end of the year if they are dependent 
variables and at the beginning of the year if they are explanatory variables. 
  
4. Specification and hypotheses 
 
All reported regressions include dummies for years. Dummy variables for 
municipalities are also included as F-tests overwhelmingly reject OLS against fixed 
effects. My empirical specification is:  
 
  FISCALit = β1MIGRAit-1 + β2MIGRAit-1*RURALi + CONTROLSitβ3 + αi + αt +εit, 
 
where FISCALit represents the respective input and revenue variables, MIGRA it is 
the net out-migration rate, RURALi is a dummy variable which takes on the value 
one for municipalities in rural areas, CONTROLSit is a vector of explanatory 
variables, αt is a set of year dummies included to control for any effects of aggregate 
factors common to all municipalities, αi represents municipal fixed effects, and εit is 
the error term. Subscripts i and t refer to municipality and year, respectively. Since 
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some time will elapse between population flows are observed and policy decisions 
are implemented, net out-migration is lagged one year.  
 
The coefficient of main interest is β2. If municipalities attempt to influence 
population movements, an increase in net out-migration should prompt a stronger 
fiscal response in rural areas than in urban areas since municipalities in rural areas 
are more interested in smoothing population flows. Thus, if local authorities seek to 
control population flows, β2 should be positive for fiscal variables that retard net 
out-migration and negative for fiscal variables that raise net out-migration.  
 
Whether and how a fiscal variable affects net out-migration depends on the 
characteristics of mobile versus immobile citizens. In Norway, a typical mover is 
young (below 45) with a high education level (Carlsen 2005). Thus, we expect that a 
municipality which attempts to slow down net out-migration will increase spending 
on day care and schools at the expense of health and care for the elderly, and cut fees 
and property taxes. 
 
5. Results 
 
Table 3 presents the panel data regressions. Net out-migration and the interaction 
term are instrumented with macroeconomic variables (national unemployment, 
change in unemployment, employment growth and the vacancy rate) interacted with 
county dummy variables. I report two regressions for each dependent variable: one 
with all explanatory variables and one where only statistically significant control 
variables are included.  
 
                               - Table 3 about here - 
 
The results strongly suggest that local authorities attempt to influence population 
flows. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive for day care and primary 
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education and negative for primary health care, care for the elderly, fees and 
property taxes. Hence, compared to urban municipalities, municipalities in rural 
areas react to out-migration by spending more on services which mainly benefit 
mobile population groups, giving less priority to services targeted at less mobile 
groups and reducing fees and property taxes.  The coefficient of the interaction term 
is statistically significant for three dependent variables (day care, health care and 
fees) and, depending on the specification, significant or close to significant for health 
care, care for the elderly and property taxes.   
 
The quantitative effects are strongest for day care, health care and fees. Relative to 
urban municipalities, rural municipalities raise the number of day care slots per 
child by 4 percentage points (0.28 standard deviations), reduce physician density by 
0.116 person years per 103 inhabitants (0.30 standard deviations) and reduce 
infrastructure fees by 243 NKR per apartment (0.22 standard deviations) in response 
to an increase in net out-migration by one standard deviation. The corresponding 
effects on schools, care for the elderly and property taxes are weaker (0.1–0.15 
standard deviations).  
 
It is interesting that the coefficients of net out-migration and the interaction term 
have opposite signs for all services but culture. The reason is probably that the 
spending implications of out-migration for rural municipalities following from 
changes in future demand are opposite to those following from the incentives to 
influence population flows: higher out-migration reduces the demand for day care 
and primary education but raises the incentives to give priority to these services in 
order to slow down out-migration. A simple regression explaining local priorities as 
a function of net out-migration is therefore not sufficient to identify strategic 
behaviour on the part of the municipalities. A strategic motive can only be identified 
by a comparison of rural and urban municipalities.    
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6. Conclusion 
 
Despite the existence of a large theoretical literature on inter-jurisdictional 
competition for mobile production factors, we still have limited knowledge of 
whether local authorities actually attempt to affect location decisions when 
determining the size and composition of local spending. This paper uses variation in 
population flows over the business cycle to discriminate between alternative 
explanations for empirical links between mobility and local fiscal variables. The 
correlation between the state of the national economy and migration from rural to 
urban areas allows computation of good instruments for population flows and 
suggests that there are systematic differences between municipalities in incentives to 
smooth population flows. Panel-data evidence suggests that municipalities indeed 
attempt to influence population flows: the sensitivity of municipal spending and 
revenue decisions to migration varies between municipalities in a way that is 
consistent with the municipalities' incentives to influence location decisions of 
households. 
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Table 1. Migration flows in Norway 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                       Average annual net out-migration rate (percentage) 
 
                        Average 1987-2004       Booms                  Recessions      
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Urban areas               -0.35                      -0.44                        -0.20              
 
Rural areas                  0.25                       0.32                         0.15 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
                                Correlation between net out-migration rate and 
 
                       change in national             national               change in regional 
                        unemploym. rate       employm. growth      unemploym. rate   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Urban areas              0.41                            -0.58                                0.41   
 
Rural areas              -0.61                             0.55                               -0.60 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Notes: All regional variables are computed at the regional level (the variables are not 
averages across municipalities). Net out-migration rates are computed as net out-
migration scaled by beginning of year population.  Boom (recession): Years with 
positive (negative or zero) national employment growth.   
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Table 2. Variable definitions and summary statistics 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Variable           Definition                                                       Municipalities    Mean  
                                                                                                          (Years)        (St.dev.) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Dependent variables: 
 
DAYCARE        End-of-year day care slots per child 0-6             409             49.6  
                           (1997- : 0-5) (percentage)                                  (1987-2004)     (14.5)             
          
SCHOOL           Teacher years scaled by  beginning                     409            11.2 
                           -of-year population 7-15 (1997- : 6-15)          (1993-2004)     (2.9) 
                           (percentage 
 
CULTURE       Annual spending (103 NKR) on culture            401-409         1.10 
                          scaled by beginning-of-year population       (1987-2004)     (0.63)     
 
HEALTH         End-of-year physicians per 103 capita                      409            1.02  
                                                                                                      (1987-2004)  (0.39)   
 
OLDCARE       Person years in care for the elderly                   400-409        15.7     
                          scaled by beginning-of-year                           (1994-2003)    (7.0)  
                          population above 66  (percentage)  
 
FEE-                  Annual municipal fees (103 NKR) paid             72-111          4.07    
INFRA               by owner of a standardized apartment        (1991-2004)      (1.11) 
 
PROPTAX        Total municipal property tax revenues             111-114         0.27  
                          (103 NKR) scaled by beginning-of-                 (1991-2004)    (1.23)  
                          year population 
 
 
Explanatory variables: 
(Mean and st.dev. for 409 municipalities, 1987-2004) 
 
 
MIGRA              Annual net out-migration scaled by begin-                           0.17              
                          ning-of-year population (percentage)                                    (1.21) 
 
GRANTS         Municipal block grants and exogenous tax                            15.7  
                          revenues scaled by beginning-of-year                                  (5.0)  
                          population (103 NKR)   
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Table 2. (cont'd) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Variable           Definition                                                                          Mean  
                                                                                                                    (St.dev.) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 
 
CHILD             Population share of children 0-6                                       8.5            
                         (1997- : 0-5) (percentage)                                                  (1.4)           
 
YOUNG          Population share of persons 7-15                                      12.8  
                        (1997-: 6-15) (percentage)                                                  (1.7)  
 
OLD                Population share of persons above 66                             15.7  
                         (percentage)                                                                                (3.8)     
 
HERF              Herfindahl index, party fragmentation                           0.28 
                         of municipal council                                                        (0.09) 
 
LEFT               Percentage of representatives from                                 40.0  
                         socialist parties in municipal council                            (15.2) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table 3. Instrumental variable panel data regressions 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
            Dependent 
            variable:         DAYCARE           SCHOOL            CULTURE          HEALTH      
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Explanatory  
variables: 
 
MIGRA                    -2.641   -2.665      -0.765   -0.779       -0.074   -0.071     0.020     0.021  
                                  (-5.70)    (-5.75)      (-7.28)   (-7.40)       (-3.88)   (-3.74)    (1.51)    (1.65)   
 
MIGRA*RURAL      3.380     3.317       0.295    0.279       -0.042   -0.035     -0.114   -0.116  
                                  (4.93)    (4.84)      (1.98)    (1.82)      (-1.06)   (-0.94)    (-4.28)  (-4.32) 
   
GRANTS                  0.156     0.156       0.031                    -0.019                    0.001   
                                  (2.18)      (2.18)       (1.44)                   (-1.06)                   (0.43) 
 
CHILD                      0.098                      -0.170    -0.178     -0.065    -0.065     -0.016    -0.015   
                                (0.62)                   (-3.14)    (-3.25)     (-5.98)   (-5.91)    (-2.42)   (-2.26) 
 
YOUNG                    0.522     0.501     -0.545    -0.548     -0.030    -0.026     -0.007  
                                  (4.38)     (4.39)   (-13.71)  (-13.72)   (-3.75)   (-3.75)     (-1.39)       
 
OLD                          0.680     0.674      0.074     0.079     -0.047    -0.054      0.005 
                                      (5.48)      (5.46)     (1.91)    (2.04)     (-5.35)   (-4.42)      (1.08) 
 
HERF                       -6.124       -5.839     -2.428   -2.377      0.124                    0.132 
                                 (-2.41)    (-2.36)    (-3.62)   (-3.54)    (1.19)                   (1.42) 
  
LEFT                         0.013                    -0.0001                 -0.002    -0.002    -0.001 
                                    (0.79)                    (-0.03)                   (-2.51)   (-2.39)   (-1.58)  
 
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Adjusted R2             0.822     0.822       0.859     0.856      0.747     0.749        0.663    0.662  
 
Observations                  7362                                  4906                        7350                     7362  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
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Table 3. (cont'd) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
            Dependent 
            variable:         OLDCARE        FEE-INFRA          PROPTAX      
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Explanatory  
variables: 
 
MIGRA                    0.187     0.236       0.122    0.166        0.108      0.102          
                                  (0.98)     (1.27)       (1.80)    (2.48)          (1.58)     (1.55)          
 
MIGRA*RURAL    -0.274   -0.417      -0.210   -0.243       -0.185    -0.153     
                                 (-1.16)  (-1.76)     (-2.08)  (-2.42)      (-1.76)    (-1.55)  
   
GRANTS                 0.040                    0.003                     -0.037                
                                 (0.79)                        (0.11)                     (-1.68)           
 
CHILD                     -0.156                      -0.032                   -0.091    -0.096    
                                 (-1.73)                  (-0.82)                       (-2.02)   (-2.15)    
 
YOUNG                  -0.087                   -0.111   -0.121        0.0004  
                                 (-1.22)                  (-3.85)  (-4.40)       (0.02)       
 
OLD                        -0.779    -0.724    -0.054                       -0.183   -0.184      
                                 (-12.00)   (-10.99)  (-1.49)                      (-2.90)   (-2.99)     
 
HERF                       0.733                          -1.027   -1.207          6.712     6.702 
                                 (0.64)                  (-1.91)   (-2.29)        (3.21)     (3.20) 
 
LEFT                       -0.003                   -0.002                      -0.023    -0.023     
                                  (-0.42)                  (-0.06)                      (-2.66)   (-2.61)   
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Adjusted R2            0.905    0.907      0.839      0.838          0.801     0.801      
 
Observations                  4061                                1446                         1578             
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
                  
Note: t-statistics corrected for heteroscedasticity in parentheses. Municipal and year 
effects (not reported) are included in all regressions.                   
 
 
 
 
